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I. Introduction
The social welfare problematics of patent pooling by competitors are well known.
Competitor patent pooling has the potential to create powerful efficiencies by eliminating holdout problems and blocking positions and reducing transactions costs
from licensing negotiations. 1 At the same time, competitors can use patent pools to
cartelize in a variety of ways, for example by fixing prices, entrenching patents of

• Professor, University of Michigan Law School. Many thanks for helpful comments and suggestions
to the participants in the conference that NYU's Engelberg Center on Innovation Law and Policy held
at La Pietra, Italy, in June 2007. In particular, thanks to Eleanor Fox, Doug Melamed, and Thomas Vinje
who served as commentators on an earlier draft of this chapter.
1 See Robert P. Merges, Institutions for Intellectual Property Transactions: The Case of Patent
Pools, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY .FOR THE
KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 123-66 (Rochelle Dreyfuss, Diane L. Zimmerman & Harry First eds., 200 I); Carl
Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, in I
INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY (Adam B. Jaffe, Josh Lerner & Scott Stem eds., 200 I).
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dubious validity, and discouraging rivalry for innovation. 2 Determining legal
norms capable ofcapturing the efficiencies without enabling cartels has not proven
easy.
Perhaps because of the practical difficulty of separating pro-competitive from
anticompetitive pools, antitrust scrutiny has swung from extreme to extreme. An
early period of antitrust laxity where arguably anticompetitive pools were permitted gave way to a middle period of antitrust strictness where arguably benign pools
were prohibited. 3 Today, US antitrust law has emerged into a more mature period
of cautious tolerance of patent pools bounded by increasingly well-defined antitrust
norms. 4
Just as antitrust is catching up to the problematics ofpatent pooling in its simplest
forms, patent pooling is becoming more complex. In particular, pools are increasingly being used as devices to facilitate the implementation of technological standards specified by standard setting organizations (SSOs). Here, again, are great
potential efficiencies and great potential for cartelization. SSOs are valuable tools
for solving coordination problems and facilitating interconnectivity. At the same
time, the widespread adoption of a standard reading on a particular patent can confer enhanced market power on the patentee. When the standard setters own multiple
patents, they may horse-trade specifications to ensure that the standard reads on
many of their patents and then pool their patents to offer a single consolidated
license to firms wishing to practice the standard. The potential for collusive inflation of the price to practice the standard is obvious. What's worse, the horse-trading
necessary to secure approval of the standard may result in suboptimal specifications (think of the effect oflegislative horse-trading on the quality oflegislation),
leading to a high-priced and low-quality end product.
The courts have only begun to address the antitrust problems arising at the intersection of patent pooling and standard-setting. As often happens, however, an
informal system of antitrust norms is arising out of the interaction between antitrust
counseling of SSO participants and those participants' engagement with the US
antitrust enforcement agencies, which have issued several business review letters
and more general guidelines, reports, and speeches on patent pools and SSOs.
In order to head off antitrust problems, SSO participants have begun voluntarily to

2 See generally 2 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, MARK D. JAN!S & MARK A. LEMLEY, IP AND ANTITRUST: AN
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW§ 34.4a-c (2002 & Supp.
2006).
3 See Richard J. Gilbert, Antitrustfor Patent Pools: A Century qf Policy Evolution, 2004 STAN. TECH.
L. REV. 3, 6-12 (2004).
4 The US antitrust enforcement agencies issued enforcement guidelines in 1995 and a joint report in
2007 outlining the agencies' views on patent pools. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE CoMM'N,
ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY§ 5.5 ( 1995), available at <http://
www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.pdf.>; U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N,
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND
COMPETITION (2007), available at <http://www.ftc.gov/reports/innovation/P040l01Promoting
InnovationandCompetitionrpt0704.pdf.> (hereinafter 'Promoting Innovation').
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adopt ex ante antitrust fixes. At the heart of these fixes is a commitment on the part
of SSO members to license their patents that are necessary to implement the SSO 's
standard on reasonable and nondiscriminatory (RAND) norms. In theory, the 'reasonable' in the RAND commitment eliminates the potential for monopoly overcharges5 in the royalty rate, and the 'nondiscriminatory' eliminates the possibility
that the SSO participants will use their patents to stifle competition downstream.
This chapter considers the sufficiency of these voluntary RAND commitments to
minimize the anticompetitive harms that may arise from the use of patent pools to
implement standards adopted by SSOs. More specifically, it advances two normative observations about the sufficiency of RAND commitments. First, the 'nondiscriminatory' prong of the RAND commitment should be read narrowly to prohibit
only discriminatory licensing to potential downstream rivals and not price discrimination more generally, else the RAND commitment tum into an inflexible commitment to license at identical terms to all potential licensees. Second, the sufficiency
of RAND commitments to eliminate competitive harms depends heavily on the
institutional and procedural context in which RAND adjudications take place.
Among other things, unless strangers to the SSO and pool are accorded third-party
beneficiary status to enforce the RAND commitment, the arbitrators or other experts
designated to adjudicate RAND disputes are sufficiently independent and subject
to some judicial oversight, and the burden of proving the reasonableness and
nondiscriminatoriness of the licensing terms is placed on the patentees, the 'fix'
may tum out to be illusory. 6
Part I of this chapter briefly summarizes the legal context from which RAND
commitments for SSO-linked patent pools arise. It provides a taxonomy of antitrust
fixes (including the RAND commitment) that have been voluntarily adopted by
SSOs and illustrates the operation of these fixes with reference to the 6C and 3C
DVD patent pools. Part II focuses on the 'nondiscriminatory' prong of the RAND
commitment. It argues that this commitment has positive value if considered as an
obligation not to foreclose competition downstream, but that it should not be read
to prevent other forms ofdiscriminatory pricing. Part III focuses on the institutional
context of adjudications over pools' RAND commitments. It argues that liberal
contractual third-party beneficiary rules, independent and properly motivated

5 Overcharges, in this context, would be prices above whatever supra-competitive price an individual
patent could command on its own. It would be inappropriate to require patentees participating in a patent
pool to give up whatever market power they had before entering the pool, since that would strongly
disincentivize participation in pools.
6 In referring to third-party standing and the burden of proof as 'procedural,' I do not mean to make
any larger legal-taxonomical statement. For instance, it is well recognized that burdens ofproofhave a
'substantive' aspect. See Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 249 (1942) (classifying
burdens of proofas 'substantive' for certain purposes offederal court jurisdiction); Cities Serv. Oil Co.
v. Dunlap, 308 U.S. 208, 210-12 (1939) (same). In referring to burdens of proof as 'procedural,'
I merely mean that it is not sufficient to ascertain a substantively correct liability norm without considering the rules that will govern its implementation in the adjudications that will inevitably arise over its
application.
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arbitrators, and burden shifting to the SSO are necessary conditions for the success
of the antitrust fix.

II. SSOs, Patent Pools, and Voluntary Antitrust Remedies
Patent pooling arrangements have been frequently tested under the US antitrust
laws, and the Supreme Court has weighed in on a number of occasions.7 There is a
voluminous, and growing, academic literature on patent pools, 8 as there is on
standard-setting.9 However, there is relatively little literature on the unique issues
that arise when SSOs employ patent pools to implement the standard. 10 This Part
briefly summarizes the key antitrust concerns that arise in simple standard setting,
considers how these concerns are affected by the use of patent pools in the SSO
context, and discusses the voluntary antitrust 'fixes' that a number of SSOs and
pools have adopted in order to stave off antitrust liability.

A. Pools without standards
Patent pools undoubtedly have many procompetitive effects. As Carl Shapiro has
observed, 'today, most basic and applied researchers are effectively standing on top
of a huge pyramid' of technologies built-and patented-by others. 11 This patent
thicket has the tendency to choke off innovation by creating a vast 'anti commons' 12
in which each patentee has a powerful holdout position against market deployment
of the new technology. Transactions costs inhibit individual negotiations of

7

The most significant cases are collected in Gilbert, n. 3 above.
See Gilbert, n. I above; Hovenkamp, Janis & Lemley, n. 2 above; Shapiro, n. I above; Atsushi
Kato, Patent Pool Enhances Market Competition, 24 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 255 (2004); Daniel P.
Homiller, Patent Misuse in Patent Pool Licensing: From National Harrow to the 'The Nine No-Nos' to
Not Likely, 2006 DUKE L. & TECH. REv. 7; Frances Marshall, Patent Pools: Perspectives on Enforcement,
867 PLIIPAT 367 (2006).
9 See Hovenkamp, Janis & Lemley, n. 2 above§ 35; Herbert Hovenkamp, Standards Ownership and
Competition Policy, 48 B.C. L. REV. 87 (2007); Robert A. Skitol, Concerted Buying Power: Its Potential
for Addressing the Patent Holdup Problem in Standard Setting, 72 ANTITRUST L. J. 727 (2005); Kraig
A. Jacobson, Revising Standard-Setting Organizations' Patent Policies, 3 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP.
43 (2004); Christopher L. Sagers, Antitrust Immunity and Standard Setting Organizations: A Case
Study in the Public-Private Distinction, 25 CARDOZO L. REv. 1393 (2004); David J. Teece & Edward F.
Sherry, Standards Setting and Antitrust, 87 MrNN. L. REv. 1913 (2003); Daniel J. Gifford, Developing
8

Models.for a Coherent Treatment ofStandard-Setting Issues Under the Patent, Copyright, and Antitrust
Laws, 43 IDEA 331 (2003); Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting
Organizations, 90 CAL. L. REv. 1889 (2002).
10 See, eg, Dorothy Gill Raymond, Benefits and Risks of Patent Pooling for Standard-Setting
Organizations, 16-SUM ANT!TRUST41 (2002).
11

Shapiro, n. I above, at 120.
See Michael Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in Transition from Marx to
Markets, l1 I HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998). Merges, n. I above, at 126-27, discusses the application of
'anticommons' theory to patent pools.
12
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licensing rights, infringement litigation costs stifle and slow the determination of
the relevant property rights, and technological progress slows.
Patent pools are a form of intra-industry social contract permitting the emergence from this Hobbesian warof each against all. 13 The patentees settle their actual
or potential infringement disputes, conduct a single round of negotiations over
licensing terms, and create a one-stop shop for outside firms wishing to license the
technology. Blocking positions are cleared, litigations settled, transactions costs
minimized, and output increased. By licensing jointly, the patentees can also
eliminate 'double marginalization'-the successive monopoly mark-ups that arise
when multiple monopolists separately price complementary or vertically related
products. 14
The primary detraction from this idyllic vision is the possibility that members of
the pool will be able to extract more than a competitive royalty rate for their patents
by collectively fixing the prices the pool will charge. Commentators have argued
that the way to ensure that the patent pool does not become a concealed cartel is to
allow the pooling of complementary, but not substitute, patents. 15 Since the pool
will only contain patents that do not compete with other patents in the pool, the
patentees will have no incentive to agree to supracompetitive royalty rates, and the
pool price should not be able to exceed the sum of the prices of the substitutes for
each of the patents in the pool, which substitutes will still be available on the open
market.
Alas, even the commitment not to pool substitutes is no guarantee that the pool
will not price as a cartel. Pool negotiations often involve discussion between
patentees with suites of patents, some substitutes and some complements. Suppose
that Acme has patents xl and yl and Beta has patents x2, which competes with xl,
and zl, which does not compete with any other patent proposed for the pool.
Following the assumed antitrust principle of 'complements only,' the pool will not
be able to include both xl and x2, so Acme and Beta will have to agree which one
comes in and which one stays out. Since both firms will want their own patent
included, they will look for some quid pro quo for agreeing to allow the other's
patent in-perhaps some 'adjustment' in the royalty rate ofyl or zl. Further, the
negotiated rate of xl or x2 could easily become a benchmark for the extra-pool
licensing of whichever patent was not included in the pool. Indeed, even if Acme
and Beta negotiate over the royalties of only complementary patents, those

13 See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 100 (Michael Oakeshott ed., 1962) (1651) ('[D]uring the time
men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war;
and such a war, as is of every man, against everyman.').
14 See AUGUSTIN COURNOT, RESEARCH INTO THE MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES OF THE THEORY OF
WEALTH (Nathaniel T. Bacon trans., 1927) (1838).
15 See, eg, Shapiro, n. I above, at 119 (arguing that a 'few relatively simple principles, such as the
desirability [of] package licensing for complementary patents but not for substitute patents, can go a
long way toward insuring that antitrust will help solve the problems caused by the patent thicket and by
holdup rather than exacerbating them').
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conversations may facilitate interdependent pricing by Acme and Beta of their
competitive patents.
From an antitrust perspective, then, patent pools are both alluring (because they
create obvious efficiencies) and suspicion-inspiring (because they create obvious
temptations to collude).
B. Pools with standards
When it comes to patent pooling in the standard-setting context, these temptations
to collusion are only compounded. We start with the problem of specifying the
standard. In principle, the goal of an SSO should be to specify the 'best' standard,
given technological constraints and cost. But the participants in the standardsetting process are not disinterested technocrats. Many of them are patentees and
the standard is likely to take a path through a thicket that includes some of their
patents. The SSO participants have an obvious interest in steering the standard
through their own patents.
One issue of concern is disclosure. A patentee who can quietly steer the standard
through his undisclosed patents will later enjoy a powerful holdout (ie, monopoly)
position. For this reason, the antitrust enforcement agencies have taken a dim view
of SSO participation by firms with undisclosed patents later adopted into the
standard, 16 and some SSOs explicitly require participants to disclose their patents
upfront. 17
Antitrust disclosure obligations and contractual enforcement by SSOs may
guarantee that the royalties and other licensing terms will be bargained for upfront,
but this merely replaces the potential for unilateral monopoly holdouts with the
potential for cartelization. As the Department of Justice and Federal Trade
Commission recognized in their recent report on intellectual property, ex ante
negotiations over licensing terms create a serious potential for both naked pricefixing (ie, agreeing on downstream prices or using standard-setting as a sham to
cover a price-fixing agreement on royalties) and the joint exercise of market power
by members of the standard-setting body. 18
In addition, there is a concern that the SSO process could degenerate into horsetrading between patentees, each willing to support gerrymandering in favor of other
16 The Rambus case, which raises such issues, is discussed below. The other major enforcement
action involving an undisclosed patent is In re Dell Computer Corp., No. 931-0097, 1995 FTC LEXIS
466, at* 10 (F.T.C. Oct. 20, 1995) (consent decree under which Dell agreed not to assert patent rights
when disclaiming the existence of such patents during the standard-setting process).
11 See Lemley, n. 9 above.
is Promoting Innovation, n. 4 above, at 50-52. Curiously, the agencies' report refers to the potential
for anticompetitive exercise of group market power as one of monopsony-buying power-as though,
outside of naked collusion, the primary antitrust concern is that the SSO would artificially suppress the
price of patent inputs by collective bargaining with patentees. To me, it seems that the much larger risk
is one of group cartelization on the selling side, as patentee-participants in the standard setting and patent
pooling process horse-trade favors.
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patentees in exchange for some gerrymandering in favor of his own patents.
For example, suppose that the optimal path for the standard is X-Y-Z, which reads
on no patents and employs the best available technology. One can image that
three patentees, each with one patent (A, B, or C), could agree to support an A-B-C
standard. In this scenario, standard-setting collusion is doubly harmful, first because
it reads on patents when it shouldn't and second because it employs a technologically inferior path.
One response to this concern is that the SSO stakeholders have a collective interest in implementing a standard that employs the best (cost-adjusted) technology,
since that will maximize the stakeholders' collective profits. Under this assumption, the stakeholders may behave collectively like a monopolist-raising prices to
the monopoly profit-maximizing point-but will be disinclined to sacrifice the
technological quality of the standard.
This observation assumes a number of coordination conditions that may not
always hold. If the SSO stakeholders have asymmetric information or opinions
about technological quality, interested patentees may be able to gerrymander the
standard to read on their patents. Additionally, influential patentees with inferior
technology will have to be compensated in some way to abandon efforts at gerrymandering. Explicit side payments are probably impossible for legal reasons and it
is not clear that SSOs have other appealing options to induce all stakeholders to
agree on the optimal path.
Empirical evidence on the behavior ofSSOs suggests that while the SSO process
does sometimes result in the choice of optimal technologies, it sometimes descends
into horse-trading or-perhaps worse-impasses between competing intellectual
property owners. Case studies by a team at the Harvard Business School on the
development of mobile Internet standards by the Institute ofElectrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) and the development ofDSL standards reached a number of
troubling conclusions about the performance of SSOs. 19 SSOs often have supermajority requirements for approving new technologies, which can lead to lengthy delays
in standard-setting as stakeholders fight for preferred positions. 20 Rules that open
participation in the standard-setting process to any member facilitate packing of the
standard-setting committees by corporate interests that want to ensure that their
technologies receive preferential treatment. 21 Finally, '[i]n some cases, the rules of
standard-setting bodies may be successfully exploited by firms with a stake in existing or alternative technologies to block the adoption of a new standard ... ' 22 Given
the difficulty in coordinating the large number of differing interests represented in

19 See Brian DeLacey et al., Strategic Behavior in Standard-Setting Organizations (Harvard Business
School Negotiation, Organizations and Markets Unit, Working Paper No. 903214, 2006), available at
<http ://papers.ssm.com/so13/papers .cfin?abstract_id=9032 l 4>.
io Ibid. at 35.
ii Ibid.
ii Ibid.
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SSOs, it would not be surprising if technological gerrymandering, resulting in the
specification of suboptimal standards, occasionally occurs.
And this is all before we come to the further step that an SSO may take to pool the
patents necessary to practice the standard. Whatever conversations over licensing
terms that were left incomplete during the creation of the standard will now need to
be continued, given that the patent poolers have become joint venturers in offering
a package license for the standard's essential patents. To the extent there is uncertainty over what patents are necessary to practice the standard, the pooling process
will allow the interested parties to resolve those issues as well. And the pool creates
a commonality of interest among the patentees in enforcing their now interdependent intellectual property rights. It is easy for the pool to become the unifying force
of the interests behind the standard-setting process-homogenizing terms, negotiating with third parties, and policing cheating on any implicit terms of the deal.
Even the ordinary antitrust principle that patent pools should include only complements and not substitutes loses traction when applied to patent pools formed to
implement standards. In the simple patent pool case, demand for the patents is
exogenous to the patent pool, so it is sensible to talk about what patents are complements or substitutes from the perspective of licensees. In the SSO context, however, the patentees themselves decide what patents are imbedded in the standard,
thus creating the demand for the patents in the pool. The patentees can make complements of two patents that otherwise would have been unrelated by drawing the
standard to include both technologies. Hence, some of the antitrust principles that
apply to patent pools unconnected to SSOs require modification when applied to
patent pools formed to implement standards.

C. A taxonomy of voluntary remedies
Antitrust lawyers are good at devising ex ante antitrust fixes-commitments to
behave pro-competitively. Given the powerful efficiencies of standard-setting and
patent pooling, antitrust lawyers can confidently counsel their clients that the courts
and enforcement agencies will be inclined to uphold these arrangements so long as
the antitrust fix is as good as it can be, even ifit allows some aggregation of market
power. In the patent-pooling/standard-setting context, 'antitrust state of the art' is
probably good enough.
The basic antitrust fixes are typically a series of commitments along the following lines: The pool will consist of only patents essential to practicing the standard,
which definitionally (although not necessarily practically) excludes the possibility
that the pool will contain substitutes. Some 'neutral' method is devised to ascertain
what patents are essential and thus belong in the pool. The license granted the pool
is nonexclusive----each patentee can continue to license all of its patents on whatever terms it chooses outside the pool. Finally, and perhaps most significantly,
the members of the pool commit to licensing on 'reasonable and nondiscriminatory' terms.
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DVD technology provides a representative example of a voluntarily adopted
antitrust fix to a standard-setting/patent pooling arrangement. In 1995, a number of
the leading consumer electronics products manufacturers and video content
creators founded the DVD Forum to set standards for the recording, production,
replication, and use of DVDs and DVD equipment. 23 The participants in the Forum
then entered into negotiations about pooling their essential patents to offer package
licensing to firms interested in implementing the standard. When the patentees
failed to agree on licensing terms, they split into two groups which became known
as the 6C 24 and 3C pools.
In 1998 and 1999, both pools received business review letters 25 from the
Department of Justice tentatively clearing the pooling arrangements. 26 The essential features of the two pools were similar and tracked the taxonomy of voluntary
remedies described above. The two pools differed somewhat in the way they allocated royalties to the patentee-the 3C pool did so on a negotiated basis that was
not contingent on the number of patents committed to the pool whereas the 6C pool
did so on a per-patent basis with some adjustments for the age of the patent.
Initially, both pools also contained similar mechanisms for ascertaining which
patents were essential to practicing the standard-the licensors retained independent patent experts to make the decision. A recent modification of the terms of the
6C pool adds a further interesting twist to the essentiality question. Under the original form licensing agreement addressed in the Justice Department's business
review letter Toshiba (on behalf ofthe pool) licensed all the essential patents owned
by the pool. The independent expert then created a list of the pooled patents that, in
his or her judgment, were essential to practicing the standard. In effect, the pool
then offered licensees a predetermined set of patents, albeit predetermined by
someone without a financial interest in forcing the licensees to take nonessential
patents.
As ofJanuary 1, 2005, the 6C pool adopted a new form oflicensing agreement. The
new agreement retains the core essentiality concept that theoretically prevents the
pool from including competitive patents in the pool (and, therefore, price fixing):
The license conferred pursuant to Article 2.1 extends only to the structure, features and functions of a DVD Product used to practice those DVD Standard Specifications applicable to

23 The history of the DVD Forum is recounted in Matsushita E/ec. Indus. Co. v. Cinram Int'/, Inc.,
299 F. Supp. 2d370, 373-74 (D. Del. 2004).
24 The '6C' designation reflects the fact that there were six original members of the pool-two
Mitsubishi companies, Hitachi, Toshiba, JVC, and AOL-Time Warner-although IBM later joined as
well. See 299 F. Supp. 2d at 374 n.2.
25 See 28 C.F .R. § 50.6 for the Department's business review letter procedures.
26 See Business Review Letter from Joel I. Klein, Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to
Garrard R. Seeney, Esq. (Dec. I 6, 1998),availableat<http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/2121.
pdf> [hereinafter 3C Business Review Letter], for the 3C pool, and Business Review Letter from Joel I.
Klein, Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Carey R. Ramos, Esq. (Jun. I 0, 1999), available at
<http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/2485.pdf> [hereinafter 6C Business Review Letter], for
the6Cpool.
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that DVD Product, and for which the DVD patents are Essential, and said license does not
extend to any structure, features or functions of a DVD Product not used to practice those
DVD Standard Specifications. 27
The license agreement then defines 'Essential' as patents that would be 'necessarily infringed' in implementing the Standard. 28 It does not, however, provide a
list of what patents are 'Essential.' Although the pool still has an independent expert
create a list of patents, which in his or her judgment are essential, and the list is
made publicly available, the license itself does not invoke the expert's list as the
contractually licensed patents. In other words, the licensees are never formally
licensed anything other than those 'essential' patents within the pool without
patent-by-patent identification of what patents are included.
This formulation of the licensing agreement ingeniously solves the potential
problem that the pool could be accused of engaging in illegal tying. Under US antitrust law, a claim of illegal tying requires showing that the defendant forced the
customer to buy two separate products. 29 Whether or not two products are separate
in the relevant sense depends on whether there is separate demand for the two products. 30 Under the 2005 6C licensing agreement, it is technically impossible for a
licensee to complain that he has been forced to take two products for which there is
separate demand. Since the license only extends to use of the patents for purposes of
implementing the standard, there will never be demand for one essential patent but
not another. At the same time, a licensee should never be able to argue that the pool
is forcing him to take non-essential patents. The answer will be that, if the licensee
is right that the patent is non-essential, then it's definitionally not licensed.
While such a formulation of the scope oflicensed rights may formally solve the
tying problem, it does little to answer deeper questions about the inclusion and pricing of patents in a pool. As noted earlier, the primary problem is not one of tying
(and, hence, of 'forcing' the licensee to take an undesired patent), but of collusion.
Mechanisms that permit a licensee to challenge the inclusion of certain patents in
the pool generally have no effect on the price of the package licenses offered by the
pool. Under the old 6C pool, for example, even if a licensee prevailed in arguing
that a patent was non-essential and therefore should not be included in the rights
licensed, there would be no change in the royalty charged by the pool for the package of licenses, which was set contractually at a flat rate between the pool members. 31 Under the new formulation, it is also not clear why a licensee would ever
have an incentive to argue that a particular patent was not included in the pool, since

27

DVD 6C MultiformatLicense V3.0,i 2.l.2, in use beginning Jan. I, 2005 (on file with author).
Ibid. Exhibit 2 'II 1.4.
29 See, eg,Jejferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 20-21 (1984).
30 Ibid.
31 See 6C Business Review Letter, n. 26 above, at 6 (specifying a royalty rate of$0.075 per DVD disc
and 4% of the net sale price of DVD players and DVD decoders, with a minimum of$4.00 per player or
decoder, regardless of the number of patents included in the pool).
2s
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the royalty rate would not change.32 Similarly, in the Philips compact disc patent
misuse litigation, the Federal Circuit rejected a patent-misuse-by-tying claim,
observing that the price for the package of patents would not be any less if nonessential patents were removed from the package. 33
The price ofa package oflicense royalties is not merely the sum ofthe individual
market values of the included patents. The patent-by-patent focus of the assumed
'essentiality' requirement is somewhat misguided in the SSO context. Patentees
participating in an SSO usually do not think in terms of the value of any particular
patent but about suites of patents corresponding to particular technological implementations. The important question in analyzing patent pools adjacent to SSOs is
whether the royalties the pool charges to practice the standard reflect the reasonable
ex ante value of technology suites offered to implement the standard or, instead,
whether the pool members have collusively inflated the price. And that question
brings us to the sufficiency of RAND commitments to police collusive royalty
inflation ex post.

III. Why Nondiscrimination Obligations?
It is not difficult to understand why promising to license on 'reasonable' 34 terms is
an important commitment for SSO members pooling theirpatents. 35 If the antitrust
problem is the market power that arises from specifying standards and then jointly
pricing the inputs necessary to practicing the standard, then agreeing not to exercise
that market power by charging supracompetitive prices ( over and above what any
of the patents could have commanded in the market before it was placed in the
standard and pooled with other patents) is a critical remedy.
The exact structure of RAND commitments will vary by context, but the essential principle is that the patentee's reasonable pricing commitment must run all the
way from the pre-standardization moment-when the choice of technologies is still
open-until the moment an end user accepts a license to implement the standard.
Conceptually, this could occur through a single set ofSSO rules or through a succession of RAND commitments by patentees along the way. For example, during
the course of the standard-setting negotiations, members of the SSO might commit

32 It is possible that a firm with a patent competitive to one in the pool might wish to assert that a
particular patent was not included the pool, since this would force any pool licensee to seek a license
from either the pool member or the competitor firm.
33 See U.S. Philips Corp. v. lnt'l Trade Comm'n,424 F.3d ll79, 1189 (Fed. Cir. 2005)('There is no
evidence that GigaStorage had any basis for its expectation that a smaller patent package might result in
a lower royalty rate.').
34 Some pools commit to licensing on 'fair and reasonable' terms, although 'fair' seems to add
nothing to 'reasonable.'
35 However, whether such commitments can be effectively enforced by arbitrators or courts is
another matter. See discussion below in Part III.
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to one another that if their individual patent technologies are selected, they will
charge only a reasonable royalty to any licensee seeking to implement the standard.
If the SSO then creates a patent pool in order to minimize transactions costs in
licensing, then the patentees might make an additional commitment to license to the
pool on RAND terms and the pool itself would then assume an obligation to license
to third parties on RAND terms.
So much for the reasonable pricing commitment. But why the commitment to not
price discriminate? The answer depends in large part on how broad the nondiscrimination commitment is. At a minimum, the commitment should be understood
as an assurance that the pool will not use discriminatory licensing to extend the
patentees' power downstream from the patents to the standardized product. But
should the commitment be read more broadly as a sort of common carrier obligation to license to all comers on uniform and nondiscriminatory terms, regardless of
the competitive impact of charging differential rates based on the demand elasticities of the licensees? That question requires entry into a thicket of contested views on
the welfare effects ofimperfect price discrimination by firms with market power.

A. Discrimination with competitive injury
In late 2004, Wuxi Multimedia and Orient Power, two related Hong Kongese and
Chinese manufacturers of DVD players, brought an antitrust case against the members of the 3C DVD patent pool. 36 Among other things, Wuxi and Orient claimed
that the 3C pool members engaged in price discrimination against licensees who
would compete with the 3C members in the manufacture of DVD players. In particular, Wuxi and Orient argued that the 3C pool discriminated by charging a royalty rate based on a percentage ofthe licensees' revenues and by waiving the license
fee for the manufacturing arms of the 3C pool's own members, and that this price
discrimination enabled the 3C members to obtain market power in the downstream
DVD player market. 37
Although the district court dismissed Wuxi and Orient's claim, 38 it is possible
that patent pools use this kind of anticompetitive price discrimination to enhance
their market power downstream. Perhaps the patentees could collectively agree to
license on terms that disadvantaged their competitors downstream, thus allowing
the pool members to exploit the market power they created by steering the standard
toward their own patents and then agreeing among themselves on the royalties that
others would have to pay to license their patents. In a moment, I shall consider how
a court could go about determining whether anticompetitive price discrimination

36 See Wu.xi Multimedia, Ltd. v. Koninklijke Philips Electronics, N. V., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9160
(S.D. Cal. 2006).
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
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has occurred. But first, a word about whether allegations of such anticompetitive
price discrimination are even plausible.
1. Does the pool have bad incentives?
Would it advantage the patent pool members to control not only the market for the
essential patented inputs into the standardized product but also the product itself?
The obvious answer might seem to be yes-two monopolies are better than onebut that conclusion does not always follow. The now-familiar 'one monopoly'
argument calls into question the incentive of a firm to leverage its monopoly power
in one market into a second, complementary or vertically related market. 39 Perhaps
the dominant firm cannot expand its profits by obtaining a second monopoly in the
downstream or complementary market, since the price increase in the second market will lead to a decrease in the demand for the monopoly product. Thus, for example, if the patent pool is already charging the monopoly price for the package of
patents, if it also monopolizes the DVD market and charges a monopoly price there
also, it is possible that it will diminish the demand for its patents and, consequently,
experience no net increase in profits from the monopolization of the DVD market.
In this view, the patentees should be happy to extract the full monopoly profit from
licensing the patents themselves and then license to whatever firms can produce the
standardized product most efficiently (ie, at the lowest possible cost), thus increasing
the use of the patents and the royalties to the pool.
Although the 'one monopoly' argument has merit in some contexts, it is not a
persuasive reason to think that patentees participating in an SSO-linked patent pool
will not try to use price discrimination to extend their monopoly power downstream. The patents licensed by a pool are often a relatively small portion of the
incremental cost of producing the standardized product. In the Wuxi and Orient
situation, the 3C DVD royalty rate was 3.5% of the net selling price of each DVD
player with a minimum of $5 per unit. 40 If the 3C pool were able to employ discriminatory royalty licensing to gain a competitive advantage in the sale of DVD
players, it could potentially obtain monopoly profits from a far larger (by revenue)
market than the patent-input market.
Further, the 'one monopoly' argument assumes that the patentee is able to charge
the full monopoly price in the upstream (here, the patent) market. But that may not
be so in the patent pooling context. Because of price-fixing concerns about patent
pools and the 'reasonable pricing' commitment such concerns force the pool to
make, the ordinary assumption may be inapplicable. Members of the patent pool

39 See, eg, 3A PHILLIPE. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ,i 756b2, at 13 (2d ed.
2002); ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 229, 239 ( 1978); Aaron Director & Edward Levi,
Law and the Future: Trade Regulation, 51 Nw. U. L. REv. 281 (1956); Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying
Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19, 20-21 ( 1957).
40 See 3C Business Review Letter, n. 26 above, at 6. The per-unit minimum was originally $7, but
dropped to $5 as of January I, 2000.
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may be reluctant, for antitrust reasons, directly to exercise their newfound market
power by charging monopoly royalty rates. Instead, patent pools may be analogous
to rate-regulated industries that cannot obtain monopoly profits in a primaty market
because of regulatory constraints and therefore use strategic practices (such as
tying) to obtain monopoly power in an adjacent, unregulated market. 41 Given these
assumptions, anticompetitive price discrimination by the pool is quite plausible.
2. How to identify anticompetitive price discrimination
One might think it would be easy to determine whether the patent pool has engaged
in price discrimination against competitors in the manufacture of the standardized
production, but it is not. The difficulty arises because the patent pool often does not
formally charge its members a royalty for using the patent. This does not mean,
however, that the patentees are using the patents cost free. They incurred substantial costs to develop the patents, which outside licensees did not. The pool members
simply are not engaging in the sort of transaction accounting that makes it easy to
compare the royalty rate charged by the pool to third-party licensees and the cost
that they effectively 'charge' themselves.
Responding to this difficulty, Daniel Swanson and Will Baumol propose a test to
determine whether a patent pool has engaged in anticompetitive price discrimination.42 Swanson and Baumol propose that courts follow the 'efficient component
pricing rule' or 'parity principle' in determining whether the pool has engaged in
anticompetitive price discrimination. 43 To determine whether the pool has charged
a discriminatory royalty rate to outsiders, a court must ascertain the price that the
pool charges itself. That price 'equals the price the firm charges customers for a
final product using that IP, minus the incremental cost to the IP-holding firm of all
other inputs, including capital, used to produce the final product. ' 44 To illustrate, in
order to make out a claim of discriminatoty pricing against the 3C pool members,
Wuxi and Orient would have to show that the price that the 3C pool members
charged customers for their DVD players minus the incremental costs of producing
the DVD player was less than the royalty the pool offered to Wuxi and Orient. 45

41

See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Analyzing Anticompetitive Exclusion, 56

ANTITRUST

L.J. 71, 85 (1987).

Daniel G. Swanson & William J. Baumol, Reasonable and Nondiscriminatory (RAND) Royalties,
Standards Selection, and Control ofMarket Power, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. I (2005).
43 Ibid. at 29.
44 Ibid. at 30.
4 s This sort oftheory is similarto a 'price squeeze' claim, which the Supreme Court rejected as a basis
forliability in Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. LinkLine Communications, Inc., 129 S.Ct. 1109 (2009). TheLinkLine
decision does not pre-empt an interpretation of RAND commitments that would disallow price squeezes
by patentees participating in SSOs. Key to the LinkLine decision was a baseline principle that monopolists who acquire market power lawfully are free to charge whatever prices they want: 129 S.Ct. at 1122.
However, a RAND commitment is by definition an obligation not to exploit monopoly power acquired
through the SSO process by charging an excessive price. Hence, in the SSO or patent pool context, the
baseline principle is completely different than in the general antitrust case.
42
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While this test sounds conceptually correct, it is easier articulated than applied.
Figuring out the incremental cost of producing a widget is a notoriously difficult
undertaking in an adjudicatory context. 46 It is particularly difficult in the high technology context, given that many of the inputs into the final product will be other
patents (patents that are not essential to practicing the standard, of course). If the
inputs to the final product are both essential and nonessential patents-both of
which the patentee does not 'charge' itself for in a formal accounting sense-it may
be possible to determine the price the patentee charges itself for all patents but next
to impossible to determine the implied internal cost of just the patents licensed by
thepool. 47
There is a further difficulty. Swanson and Baumol have in mind a situation where
a single patentee licenses competitors its patents. In that case, it is theoretically possible to determine the fee the firm is implicitly charging itself. Similarly, if all
members are charging themselves a lower implied rate than the pool's royalty rate
to third party licensees, then 'the pool' is price discriminating in a potentially anticompetitive manner. But what if the pool has many members who charge themselves different implied rates as determined by Swanson and Baumol's parity
principle? What if some charge less and others more than the third party royalty
rate? In that case, there is no principled basis for saying that 'the pool' is price discriminating since the pool is not making a collective decision as to the price of each
member's finished product. Nonetheless, such differentiated downstream pricing
could have exclusionary effects on non-member rivals.
The practical difficulties of showing price discrimination in the patent pooling
context are not insurmountable. As discussed in Part III, one way to alleviate competitive concerns in these sorts of cases is to place the burden ofjustifying the royalty on the licensor, which incentivizes the pool participants to devise transparent
and objectively justifiable licensing structures. For now, it is sufficient to observe
that discriminatory pricing in a way that produces downstream market power is a
serious concern-indeed, the paradigmatic concern motivating the 'nondiscriminatory' prong of the RAND commitment.

46 A good example of this is the fact that Baumol devoted an entire article to exploring the economic
meaning of the Areeda-Turner average variable cost test after courts had been struggling to apply it for
more than 20 years. William J. Baumol, Predation and the Logic qfthe Average Variable Cost Test, 39
J.L. & ECON. 39 (1996) (interpreting the test proposed in Phillip Areeda & Donald Turner, Predatory
Pricing and Related Practices under Section 2 qfthe Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 637 (1975)). On
the difficulty ofundertaking cost-revenue comparisons in litigation, see generally Daniel A. Crane, The
Paradox qfPredatory Pricing, 91 CORNELL L. REV. I, 43--44 (2005).
47 Requiring the patent pool to charge its members a royalty for use of the pool's patents would do
nothing to alleviate this problem. So long as the pool proceeds are properly allocated among the pool
members, the pool members should be indifferent to the rate charged, since (putting aside administrative
costs) they would withdraw from the pool as profits every dollar paid into the pool as a royalty. Formal
intra-pool accounting will not account for the economic cost of the patents when incorporated into the
pool members' end products.

386

PART III: PUBLIC ORDERING

B. Discrimination without competitive injury
Baumol and Swanson's efficient component pricing rule is not intended to eliminate
all price discrimination, but only that which could cause competitive injury downstream.48 If the pool is licensing patents for use in products that the pool members
do not make and that do not compete with products that the pool members make,
there is no possibility of competitive injury in the sense that Baumol and Swanson
contemplate. But should competitive injury be a necessary condition fora discriminatory licensing term to violate a RAND commitment? Answering this question
requires examining the contested issue of whether non-exclusionary price discrimination-price discrimination that does not have the effect of enhancing market
power-generally has positive, negative, neutral, or indeterminate social welfare
effects.
There was a time when antitrust scholars associated with the 'Chicago School'
oflaw and economics made the broad assertion that price discrimination is welfare
enhancing and, accordingly, should not be discouraged. 49 The simple logic of this
proposition was that a monopolist that priced at each customer's reservation price
would make a sale to every customer willing to pay at or above the good' s marginal
cost of production. Hence, price discrimination would expand output to the fullest
possible degree.
If this view of price discrimination were correct, and assuming that the goal of
antitrust policy is to maximize total social welfare, 50 then it would be wrong to read
a RAND commitment as forbidding anything other than anticompetitive price
discrimination leading to downstream market power. Other forms of price discrimination, such as charging different royalty rates to different downstream producers
based on the price elasticity of the consumers of the final products, should be permitted on the view that such price discrimination would tend to increase output. 51
Such price discrimination may even benefit all consumers ( and not only those with
elastic demand) ifthe price discrimination causes an expansion ofoutputthat allows
the producer to reach new economies of scale. 52

48 Swanson & Baumol, n. 42 above, at 23-26 (noting that price discrimination can be socially beneficial, particularly when it follows the Ramsey formula, and noting that the authors 'would not expect that
"reasonable" royalties would invariably be uniform and identical across all fields of use, territories, and
customers').
49 See, eg, Bork, n. 38 above, at 396-98. To be fair, the Chicago School never described price
discrimination as an unqualified good. See eg, RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
127-28 ( I st ed. 1972) (describing welfare consequences ofimperfectprice discrimination as indeterminate or potentially negative).
50 This is an important caveat in the price discrimination context, since perfect price discrimination
expands output but also produces substantial wealth transfers from consumers to producers.
51 See Benjamin Klein & John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Competitive Price Discrimination as an Antitrust
Justification for Intellectual Property R(!fusals to Deal, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 599 (2003).
52 See Jerry A. Hausman & Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason, Price Discrimination and Patent Policy, 19
RAND J. ECON. 253 (1988).
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Alas, the story is never so simple. The Chicago School's embrace of price
discrimination is coming under increasing criticism by scholars who claim that
even non-exclusionary uses of price discrimination by firms with dominant intellectual property rights can be socially harmful. For example, two recent amicus
curiae briefs by prominent economists and law professors warned the Supreme
Court that tie-in contracts used as metering devices to facilitate price discrimination were likely to have negative social welfare effects. 53 One brief, in particular,
stressed that the negative social welfare result did not depend on the price discrimination resulting in the leverage of market power from a patented product into a
complementary market or the defense of the monopoly in the patented product. 54
Rather, the authors argued flatly that 'there is no reason to believe that price discrimination is efficient,' given that only first-degree or perfect price discrimination
is demonstrably welfare enhancing, whereas the price discrimination observed in
actual practice is virtually always imperfect and usually welfare reducing. 55
So to whom should the court listen in determining the meaning of a RAND obligation? Should they read a competitive injury requirement into the RAND undertaking or hold that 'nondiscriminatory' forbids price discrimination-period-as
an antidote to the exercise of monopoly power by the pool? As a general proposition, courts should only find that a patent pool has violated a nondiscrimination
obligation if it has licensed its patents in a way that is likely to create downstream
market power. Although the interpretation of a RAND commitment may be a
contractual rather than antitrust exercise (more on this in Part III), courts should not
assume that the patent pool would have created an antitrust fix that prohibited even
non-anticompetitive price discrimination.
There are simply not enough strong reasons to believe that non-exclusionary
price discrimination of the kind likely to be practiced by a patent pool is socially
harmful enough to warrant a more expansive reading of the nondiscrimination
commitment. Indeed, there are likely to be relatively few opportunities for the pool
to engage in non-exclusionary price discrimination. One of the most common ways
that a patentee could engage in price discrimination is by engaging in mixed bundling-offering to license a package oflicenses at a lower collective rate than the
sum of the royalties charged for the patents individually. 56 Mixed bundling can
53 See Brief Amicus Curiae ofF .M. Scherer in Support of Respondent, 2005 WL 2427642 (Sept. 28,
2005), and Brief of Bany Nalebuff, Ian Ayres & Lawrence Sullivan as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondent, 2005 WL 2427646 (Sept. 28, 2005), Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547
U.S. 28(2006).
54 See BriefofBany Nalebuff, n. 53 above, at 12-13 (noting that it was unlikely that the tie-contract
would lead to monopolization but nonetheless warning that the price discrimination itself would be
socially costly).
55 See Brief of Bany Nalebuff, n. 53 above, at l 9-20.
56 See Hal Varian, Price Discrimination, in I HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 626 (Richard
Schmalensee & Robert Willig, eds. l 989); William James Adams & Janet L. Yellen, Commodity
Bundling and the Burden of Monopoly, 90 Q.J. ECON. 475, 476 (1976); R. Preston McAfee, John
McMillan & Michael D. Whinston, Multiproduct Monopoly, Commodity Bundling, and the Correlation
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only occur, however, when two or more goods are packaged together. 57 When
patents that are essential to practicing a standard are packaged together and licensed
only for use in practicing the standard, there is no real sense in which the licensed
patents are separate products. They are a single necessary input to producing a
downstream product and can only be used for that purpose. Thus, the package
licensing of pooled patents in the SSO context is unlikely to serve the ordinary price
discrimination function of mixed bundling.
When a pool does seek to engage in price discrimination, it will generally be
third-degree price discrimination58-charging different royalty rates to different
classes of licensees based on the kind of standardized product the licensee intends
to make. The pool may follow such a strategy to promote the sale of particular applications of the standardized technology that may increase demand for other applications and hence, in the long run, maximize the value of the patents imbedded in the
standard. For example, suppose that an SSO created a specification for patentrazorblade interconnections that read on several patents that were then pooled and
licensed to both razorblade and razor manufacturers. In order to follow the proverbial path of giving away the razor to sell the razorblade, the pool might decide to
license the patents to razor manufacturers for virtually nothing and charge a much
higher rate to the razorblade manufacturers. Such offering of differential licensing
terms would be 'discriminatory' in a lay sense, but is at least as likely to be welfare
enhancing as welfare reducing and therefore should not be construed to violate the
RAND commitment.
The legal treatment ofprice discrimination is at a crossroads in the United States.
Even as post-Chicago School scholars are pushing back on the Chicago School's
undifferentiated embrace of price discrimination, other forces are working to
abolish the remaining legal norms that create liability for non-exclusionary price
discrimination. 59 Until there is a clear consensus on the welfare effects of nonexclusionary price discrimination in the patent pooling context, the tie-breaker
should go to non-liability if forno other reason than that litigation is expensive and
courts are well advised to follow the venerable principle 'first, do no harm.'

of Values, 104 Q.J. EcoN. 371,371 (1989); Richard Schmalensee, Gaussian Demand and Commodity
Bundling, 57 J. Bus. S21 l, S21 l (1984).

See Varian, n. 56 above, at 626.
See ROBERT s. PINDYCK & DANIELL. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 387-88 (6th ed. 2005).
59 Two recent occurrences are of particular importance. In Volvo Trucks N Am .• Inc. v. Reeder-Simco
GMC, Inc., 126 S.Ct. 860 (2006), the Supreme Court appeared to read a competitive injwy requirement
into the Robinson-Patman Act, asserting that it 'would resist interpretation [of the Robinson-Patman
Act] geared more to the protection of existing competitors than to the stimulation of competition.' Ibid.
at 872. Then, the Congressionally appointed Antitrust Modernization Commission recommended repeal
of the entire Robinson-Patman Act, the US statute that prohibits certain forms of price discrimination.
Report and Recommendation ofAntitrust Modernization Commission (April 2007), available at <http://
www.amc.gov/commission_documents.htm>.
57

58
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IV. The Institutional Context of RAND Adjudication
In 2007, the Department ofJustice and Federal Trade Commission released a report
on antitrust enforcement and intellectual property rights. In this Report the Agencies
indicated that a number of experts who testified at the Agencies' hearings felt that
RAND commitments were close to useless as remedies for the abuses that may
arise from SSOs. 60 That assessment, if accurate, is sobering given that most of the
other voluntary antitrust commitments made by patent pools ( such as the essentiality commitment) have little power to solve the relevant antitrust concerns.
Much of the skepticism appears to be that 'reasonable and nondiscriminatory'
are empty concepts. 61 That's true enough as a henneneutic statement-what's
abstractly 'reasonable' is surely in the eye ofbeholder62-but it would be a mistake
to pre-emptively doom RAND commitments to failure based on the vacuousness of
the word 'reasonable.' Every litigator knows that the words of a contract, statute,
regulation or other writing matter far less than the choice of adjudicatory body and
its institutional rules. Common law courts in the Anglo-American system will give
the words concrete meaning over time, 63 just as the courts have poured meaning
into the reasonable pricing commitments ofthe ASCAP and BMI consent decrees. 64
The important question is how the rules of the adjudicatory process will shape the
words' meaning. RAND commitments are only as robust as the institutional structures and procedures that police them. In this final section, I advance three procedural constructs that, ifread into RAND commitments, could increase the chances
that RAND commitments will be viable antitrust remedies.

A. RAND commitment as contract
Who will enforce the RAND commitments? Obviously, the parties to a patent pool
themselves, and probably other participants in an SSO to which the pool is adjacent,

60

Promoting Innovation, n. 4 above, at 46-47.
Ibid. at 4 7 and n. 74 below.
62 Conveniently, 'nondiscriminatory' is defined in Part IL
63 Skepticism about the success of RAND commitments seems premature given that courts have
done almost no work in this area. A search of the Westlaw database reveals only 14 cases that even mention the words 'reasonable and nondiscriminatory' and 'patent' in the same paragraph, and very few of
these engage in any effort to give content to a RAND commitment.
64 Despite a general view that courts do not make good rate regulators, courts do frequently involve
themselves in deciding whether prices or fees are reasonable. For example, the US Supreme Court has
just granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split over whether the Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a- I et seq., limits mutual fund advisers to a fee bearing a 'reasonable relationship' to the services
provided. Jones v. Harris Assoc. L.P., 537 F.3d 728 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S.Ct. 1579.
Interestingly, in the Seventh Circuit, the two leading 'Chicago School' jurists took opposite positions on
this question. Judge Easterbrook held that no such reasonable fee obligation exists, whereas Judge
Posner believed that it might. Cf. Jones v. Harris Assoc. L.P., 527 F.3d 627 (2008) (Easterbrook, J.),
with Jones, 537 F.3d 728 (2008) (Posner, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane).
61

390

PART III: PUBLIC ORDERING

have enforcement rights as parties to the network of contracts embodying the
pool and SSO. But RAND commitments without a right of legal enforcement by
strangers-Wuxi and Orient in our earlier example-are a weak obstacle to patent
pool cartelization or monopolistic exclusion of potential rivals. Unless the government assumes a vigorous monitoring and enforcement role, effective enforcement
ofRAND obligations requires that all persons seeking a license be treated as third
party beneficiaries of the RAND commitment.65 In this regime, enforcement of the
RAND obligation occurs as a matter of contract by any affected party.
Conceiving of the RAND commitment as an enforceable contract greatly simpl ifies third party challenges to the pool's proposed licensing terms. Absent third party
beneficiary status, potential licensees would need to prove a complex antitrust
case-ie, define a relevant market, show market power, prove anticompetitive
effects, etc. This is whatthe FTC effectively did in/n re: Negotiated Data Solutions,
Jnc., 66 which resulted in a January, 2008 consent decree. The FTC alleged that
N-Data reneged on a prior licensing agreement to an SSO and thereby was able to
raise the royalty on its patents for Ethernettechnology. In 1994, N-Data' s predecessor in interest, National Seminconductor, committed to the Institute of Electrical
and Electronics Engineers that, if the National's NWay technology were chosen
for the standard, National would license NWay to any requesting party for a onetime license fee of $1,000. In 2002, after NWay had become irrevocably locked
into the standard in the wake of the dot com bust, a successor to National attempted
to renege on the 1994 agreement and sought millions of dollars of licensing royalties. Both the three-member FTC majority and the two dissenting commissioners
treated this as an issue of antitrust law rather than ofcontract, which perhaps created
greater complexities than needed. Treating the patentees' RAND commitment as
an enforceable promise to simplify future adjudications over the lawfulness of
challenged licensing terms, by dispensing with antitrust complexities and allowing
the tribunal to focus on the fairness of the proffered terms, would cut through
antitrust's Gordian knot.
To be sure, even a contractual dispute over the meaning of a RAND commitment
will need to invoke some antitrust principles as background to understanding the
words of the contract. For example, I suggested earlier that the word 'nondiscriminatory' should be read to mean 'nondiscriminatory as against downstream rivals of
the patent pool members,' effectively importing a competitive injury requirement
into discrimination adjudications. Requiring the licensee to prove a full case of
competitive injury in an antitrust sense, however, would require many of the complexities that the RAND commitment should avoid-defining the downstream
market, proving the existence of entry barriers, etc. Courts could alleviate these

65 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 302 (1981 }. To be a third-party beneficiary, the third
party must be a creditor or intended donee of the promisor.
66 FTC File No. 0510094 (Jan. 23, 2008), available at <http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2008/0l/ethernet.
shtm>.
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complexities by reading the competitive injury requirement into the RAND commitment to the extent of requiring the licensee to show that it was the downstream
competitor of the patent pool and was offered discriminatory licensing terms, but
requiring nothing more than that showing to make out a violation of the RAND
obligation. In that sense, the contractual adjudication would borrow from antitrust
law to the extent necessary to construe the meaning of the patentee's promissory
undertaking but not require proof of a full antitrust case.

B. Inversion of burden ofproof
Much of the skepticism over the effectiveness of RAND obligations has to do with
the difficulty of proving what a 'reasonable' royalty rate is. In principle, a royalty
fora pool license will be reasonable ifit is no greater than the ex ante market value
of the sum of the patents included in the pool. 67 But how is the licensee supposed to
prove that ex ante market value? Once the standard has been set and the patents
pooled, the proverbial horse is out of the barn and recovering the ex ante world may
be very difficult. Further, to the extent that the patent pool is working with new
technologies and previously blocking patents, there may be no ex ante world on
which to draw in proving the reasonable rate.
To see the difficulty, consider the Federal Trade Commission's recent enforcement action against Rambus. In 2006, the Commission found that Rambus monopolized the market for four technologies incorporated into a standard adopted by the
Joint Electron Device Engineering Council (JEDEC) by failing to disclose the existence of certain patents or patent applications. 68 Once the standard was adopted,
Rambus had a powerful holdout position with respect to its previously undisclosed
patents. Having found Rambus liable, the Commission was then faced with the difficult matter of specifying a future-oriented remedy that would prevent Rambus
from charging a higher royalty rate than it could have negotiated ifit has disclosed
its patents during the standard-setting process. Understandably, the Commission
found that '[t]here [was] no direct evidence as to what royalty rate would have
resulted from ex ante SDRAM negotiations among the parties had Rambus not
engaged in the unlawful conduct. ' 69 So the Commission considered the range of
royalties that Rambus might have been able to negotiate in the but-for world and
entered an injunction prohibiting Rambus from charging a royalty rate higher than
prescribed rates at the lower end of the assumed range. 70 This effectively forced

67

That is to say, ex ante the adoption of the standard and the fonnation of the pool.
Rambus, Inc., Docket No. 9302 (Fed. Trade Comm'n Aug. 2, 2006), available at <http://www.ftc.
gov/os/adjpro/d9302/060802commissionopinion.pdf>.
69 Rambus, Inc., Docket No. 9302 (Fed. Trade Comm'n Feb. 5, 2007) (final order), at 17, available
at<http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9302/070205opinion.pdf>.
70 Ibid at 22.
68
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Rambus to internalize the costs of the uncertainty that it created by failing to
disclose the patents. 71
This is a common and sensible fix. The party who created the uncertainty should
bear the burden of proving the hard-to-prove fact. In Rambus's case, there is a
somewhat punitive aspect to this rule-other SSO participants will be deterred
from failing to disclose essential patents by the knowledge that this could prevent
them from charging anything more than the lowest number in the range of royalties
that could plausibly result from an ex ante auction. In the case ofSSOs and patent
pools, the justification for placing the burden ofproof on the pool is not punitive but
practical. The pool will be in a better position to justify the licensing terms it offers
than the licensees will be to attack them. Such an inversion of the burden of proof
should also incentivize the pool to document its royalty decisions and create a
sufficient record for future evaluation during the formation of the pool.
Inverting the burden of proof-requiring the licensor to justify the proffered
terms rather than requiring the licensee to prove them unreasonable-is actually a
familiar remedy in the intellectual property-antitrust intersection context. Under
the ASCAP and BMI consent decrees, the licensors bear the burden of proving the
reasonableness of the fee requested. 72 If the licensor and licensee cannot agree on
the rate, it is set by a court with doubts construed against the licensor. It is only
sensible to require the parties whose conduct creates the uncertainty as to the
reasonableness of the licensing terms to bear the burden of sustaining their
reasonableness.
C. Meaningful judicial review
The effectiveness of the first two proposed procedural rules depends critically on
the integrity of the adjudicatory bodies that decide disputes concerning RAND
obligations. Many patent pools that commit to RAND obligations specify that any
dispute concerning the RAND commitment will be resolved by some neutral
expert. 73 In reviewing the DVD patent pools, the Justice Department expressed
71 The FTC's choice of remedy was never reviewed in court because the United States Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit subsequently rejected the FTC's underlying theory ofliability and the US
Supreme Court denied certiorari, thus mooting the remedy question. See Rambus, Inc. v. Fed. Trade
Comm 'n,522F.3d456(D.C. Cir.2008),cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 1318(2009). The European Commission
has issued a Statement of Objections against Rambus concerning the same facts, and the proceedings
there are ongoing. See Antitrust: Commission Confi.rms Sending a Statement of Objections to Rambus,
EUROPA, Aug. 23, 2007, available at <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=
MEMO/07/330&form>.
72 See, eg, United States v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 426 F .3d 91, 95 (2d Cir. 2005).
73 For example, the current 6C license agreement contains an arbitration clause calling for arbitration
of claims between Iicensors and licensees to occur under the auspices of the American Arbitration
Association under the International Arbitration Rules ofthe International Centre for Dispute Resolution.
DVD 6C Multiformat License, n. 27 above, at ,r 6.4. Separately, the agreement calls for any dispute
between licensors and licensees as to the determination of RAND terms and conditions 'to be determined by an expert jointly appointed and paid by Licensee and Licensor or the other member of the
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deep skepticism that experts retained and paid for by the pool to determine which
patents were essential would be truly 'neutral. ' 74 The same could be said for arbitrators retained by the parties to resolve RAND disputes. Persons with technological
expertise in the relevant field-the most likely candidates to be selected as neutral
experts or arbitrators-have much to lose by displeasing the dominant patentees in
the field, who may be the experts' most likely source ofrepeat business. Thus, there
is some legitimate concern that even experts or arbitrators selected jointly by the
licensor and licensee may tend to err in the direction of the pool.
What is the licensee's remedy in the event that the neutral expert or arbitrator
undertakes a less than robust review of the terms offered by the pool? Very little.
The Federal Arbitration Act makes arbitrator decisions final, except in cases of
fairly severe misconduct by the arbitrators-evident partiality, exceeding delegated
authority, etc. 75 There is no appeal from an arbitrator's decision.
Nonetheless, there is one strong check against systematic pro-pool bias by the
adjudicatory apparatus established by the pools. Third-party licensees can always
bring a direct antitrust suit against the pool or assert an antitrust counterclaim or
patent misuse defense in an infringement action brought by the patentee.76 Although
the US Supreme Court has held that antitrust cases are subject to arbitration, 77 an
arbitration clause would only be binding on members ofthe patent pool. A potential
licensee who is not a member of the pool or the SSO cannot be forced to arbitrate
under an arbitration agreement to which it is not a party. This is the flexibility created by third-party beneficiary status. The potential licensee can invoke the contractual mechanisms, taking with it the good (direct RAND suit; no need to prove a
full antitrust claim) and the bad (potentially biased arbitration), or else it can simply
proceed directly to the antitrust claim.
The shadow of antitrust liability should be a sufficiently strong background
condition to keep the pools-and their appointed arbitrators and neutral expertshonest. And, of course, exercise of monopoly power by the pools is always subject
to attack by the antitrust enforcement agencies and state attorneys general, which
are not subject to restrictive standing rules or arbitration provisions. So long as the
judicial corridors remain open for some meaningful review of the licensing terms
offered by the pools, RAND commitments have the potential to be effective
antitrust remedies.

Group.' Ibid at ,r 3.2. This apparently creates a two-stage dispute resolution process with an initial
infonnal mediation by an industry expert and then the possibility of escalation to fonnal arbitration.
74

3C Business Review Letter, n. 26 above, at 12.
9 u.s.c. §§ 1-307.
Third party licensees have followed both paths. Cinram, n. 23 above, was an antitrust counterclaim
to a patent infringement action brought by Matsushita Electrical. Wu.xi and Orient were antitrust actions
in federal court initiated by the licensees. Wu.xi, n. 36 above.
77 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 ( I 985).
75
76
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V. Conclusion
Given the importance of the RAND commitment as an antitrust fix to the SSOpatent pooling problem, it is surprising that there has not been more attention given
to the meaning of the nondiscrimination prong. IfRAND commitments are to be a
successful fix, the 'nondiscrimination' prong will need to be better understood and
articulated. And even a precise and well explained definition of the RAND commitment will be next to worthless unless the institutional apparatus for its implementation is properly structured. SSOs and patent pools offer great promise for
technological advancement, but they require a robust set of antitrust remedies to
ensure that their benefits trickle down-indeed, pour down-to consumers.

